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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
DENNIS J. GARCIA, : Case No. 20080606-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Randall Skanchy, presiding. The Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e), see Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2008), whereby the defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for 
anything other than a first degree or capital felony. Appellant was convicted of 
automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-207 
see id § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue I: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict, 
convicting Mr. Garcia of automobile homicide. 
Preservation: Although Mr. Garcia made a motion for directed verdict at the close of 
the State's case, he argued that the cause of Mr. Buckley's death was inconclusive. On 
appeal, Mr. Garcia raises additional claims of insufficient evidence. These claims can be 
reviewed for plain error. 
Standard of Review: Generally, "|f]o demonstrate plain error, a defendant must 
establish that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, [the court's] 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, |^ 13,10 P.3d 
346 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 
(Utah. 1993)). However, in the sufficiency of the evidence context, to demonstrate plain 
error Mr. Garcia must establish (1) "that the evidence was insufficient to support [his] 
conviction" and (2) "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial 
court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Hoi gate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 17. Discussing 
this standard in greater detail, the supreme court has explained that 
[Utah Code] Section 77-17-3 states that when the evidentiary 
defect is'apparent'to the trial court, the court'shall'discharge 
the defendant. It necessarily follows that the trial court 
plainly errs if it submits the case to the jury and thus fails to 
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discharge a defendant when the insufficiency of the evidence 
is apparent to the court. 
14 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1999)) (current version at Utah Code 
Ann. §77-17-3(2003)). 
Furthermore, on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court 
"reviewfs | the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^ 15, 63 
P.3d 94. The court "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." Id. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 
The text of the following statutes is attached in addendum A: 
Utah Code section 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 8, 2008, Defendant/Appellant Dennis Garcia and his friend Thomas 
Shane Buckley were involved in a single car accident, after which Mr. Buckley died. 
Approximately one month later, Mr. Garcia was charged with automobile homicide, a 
third degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006), and failure to maintain 
control of a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor. See R. 10-11. Approximately two days 
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before trial, the State dropped the failure to maintain control of a vehicle charge, and Mr. 
Garcia proceeded to a jury trial for automobile homicide. Sec R. 54, 55. 
At the close of the State's case, Mr. Garcia's attorney moved for a directed verdict 
on the basis that the cause of Mr. Buckley's death was inconclusive. R. 104:294. The 
trial court denied defense counsel's motion, and the case was presented to the jury. |dL 
After approximately two hours of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. R. 
104:328. On June 2, 2008, Mr. Garcia was sentenced to zero to live years in the Utah 
State Prison. R. 105:10. At the close of his sentencing proceeding, his trial counsel 
withdrew. R. 105:10. Mr. Garcia then filed an appeal, which was received in the court 
of appeals on July 8, 2008. R. 95. Mr. Garcia was appointed counsel on August 8, 2008, 
and on September 10, 2008, the court of appeals issued a sua sponte motion for summary 
disposition based on lack of jurisdiction for an untimely appeal. Mr. Garcia then filed a 
memorandum and an affidavit attesting that he put his notice of appeal in the prison mail 
system with postage prepaid prior to July 2, 2008. The court of appeals accepted the 
affidavit under rule 4(g) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the jurisdictional 
defect was cured on October 2, 2008. Sec Order, Utah Court of Appeals, October 2, 
2008. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 8, 2008, Mr. Garcia and Mr. Buckley were driving in Mr. Garcia's 
Mazda along U-l 11 or Bacchus Road when they were involved in a single car accident. 
R. 2, 103:154. There were no witnesses to the accident. The first person who arrived at 
the scene was a man named Brandon Donivan. R. 2. Mr. Donivan drove past Mr. 
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Garcia's car and saw that it was damaged. R. 103:105. He slowed down and less than a 
mile later, turned ciround to see if he could help. R. 103:105. When Mr. Donivan arrived 
at the accident scene, Mr. Garcia began walking toward him. R. 103:93. He was 
disoriented and asked Mr. Donivan "if [he] knew what had happened and if [he] knew 
what was going on." Mr. Garcia also asked for a ride home. R. 103:95. When Mr. 
Donivan agreed, Mr. Garcia walked back to his car and started talking to Mr. Buckley. 
R. 103:95. He said, "Come on. Get up. He's going to give us a ride. Come on." 
R.l03:95. After Mr. Buckley did not respond, Mr. Garcia got into Mr. Donivan's car and 
drove away. R. 103:95-96. A few minutes later, the two men realized they should go 
back and help Mr. Buckley. IdL They turned around and when they arrived back at the 
Mazda, there were two other witnesses there. R. 103:97. Mr. Donivan got out of his 
car and approached Mr. Garica's vehicle, where he saw Mr. Buckley in the back seat with 
his head toward the driver's side and his feet behind the passenger seat. R. 103:99. 
Jeff Gallegos, the second witness to arrive at the accident scene, also observed Mr. 
Buckley lying face down in the back seat of the car with his hand over the driver's side 
head rest and his feet toward the passenger seat. R. 103:113. Mr. Gallegos's brother in 
law, Matt Bruce, who was with Mr. Gallegos, called 911. R. 103:113. The 911 dispatch 
operator instructed the men to remove Mr. Buckley from the car and start administering 
CPR. R. 103:114, 116. Mr. Gallegos, with the assistance of Mr. Donivan, pulled Mr. 
Buckley from the car and a third witness began administering CPR. R. 103:119, 116. 
1
 The third witness did not testify at trial because the police neglected to get any 
identifying information from him. R. 104:258. 
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While they were doing that, Mr. Garcia was asking Mr. Buckley, "What did you do to my 
car?" R. 103:122. Not long after Mr. Buckley was removed from the car, the 
paramedics showed up and "took over." R.103:117. 
Mr. Buckley was airlifted to the University of Utah emergency room, and Mr. 
Garcia was transported there as well. R. 103:154-55. At the hospital, Mr. Garcia was 
treated for minor injuries, including cuts and scrapes on his head and a minor left leg 
injury. R. 104:228, 278. The police also drew Mr. Garcia's blood and discovered that he 
had a blood alcohol level of .15. R. 103:159. He also tested positive for THC and 
cocaine. R. 3. Based on these results, the police arrested Mr. Garcia and charged him 
with automobile homicide and failure to maintain control of a vehicle. R. 4. A few days 
before trial, the State dropped the failure to maintain control of a vehicle charge, and Mr. 
Garcia proceeded to trial only on the automobile homicide charge. R. 54, 55. 
At Mr. Garcia's trial, Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner, testified that Mr. 
Buckley had suffered internal brain injuries during the car accident and he was without 
sufficient oxygen for a prolonged period of time and that those injuries likely caused Mr. 
Buckley's death. R. 103:142. Dr. Grey also noted that Mr. Buckley's blood was tested 
approximately eleven hours after the accident, at 12:30 p.m., and at that time, his blood 
alcohol level was .07. R. 103:141, 143. There were also metabolites of cocaine in his 
system. R.103:141. Dr. Grey also testified that Mr. Buckley had some injuries on the 
right and left side of his body and he was not wearing a seatbelt. Based on his pattern of 
injuries, Dr. Grey could not discern who was driving the vehicle. R. 103:144 -45, 149-
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50. Specifically, Dr. Grey stated that "neither the extent nor pattern of injuries that I 
documented allowed me to say if he was either a driver or a passenger." R. 103:145. 
Officer Black of the West Valley City Police Department also testified at Mr. 
Garcia's trial. He was the blood technician who drew Mr. Garcia's blood. R.103:157. 
Officer Black stated that Mr. Garcia repeatedly stated that he was not driving the car and 
he would not consent to a blood draw. R.103:157. Officer Black had to get a search 
warrant to test Mr. Garcia's blood. R. 103:158. Sergeant John Pearce, another officer at 
the scene, also testified that Mr. Garcia insisted that he was not driving the vehicle. 
R.103:172-73. 
Darren Getz, the State's accident reconstructionist, also provided testimony at Mr. 
Garcia's trial. He began by noting that the roads were wet on the evening of the accident. 
R. 104:193. He then presented his theory of the accident. Based on his photographs and 
calculations, he thought that the car was traveling approximately fifty-five to sixty-five 
miles per hour, the car went off the road to the left, and the driver applied the brakes. 
R.104:204, 209. The vehicle then traveled to the other side of the road and the right side 
of the vehicle impacted a guardrail. R. 104:207. The vehicle then rotated'clockwise and 
it "came around" and impacted the guardrail again, this time on the left side of the 
vehicle. R. 104:208-09, 212. The car continued in a clockwise rotation, it reentered the 
roadway, ran along a jersey barrier on the left side of the road and came to a stop. R. 
104:215. 
The posted speed limit at the location of the accident is sixty miles per hour. R. 104:321. 
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Based on the movement of the car, Officer Getz surmised that the people in the car 
would have moved to the left as the car turned to the right. R. 104:218. To confirm this 
theory, Officer Getz re-enacted the accident, taking "slow right turns" at approximately 
ten to fifteen miles per hour. R. 104:231. He also found some marks in the car, i.e., 
indentations in the fabric, to indicate that the passenger moved in a backwards and left 
direction. R. 204:218-19. Officer Getz also noted that there was some blood spatter in 
the car, the left rear window was shattered out, as was the windshield, and there was an 
indentation indicating that "something heavy struck the inside door on the left rear door." 
R. 104:221. Officer Getz could not identity what caused the dent except to say that 
"something . . . came diagonal through the seats striking in this area right here and 
pushing out that door panel and bending it like that." R. 104:221. He also explained that 
the dent was "induced damage," "damage that's secondary to the primary contact damage 
. . . . [I]t happens after." R.104.-221. While the damage may have been induced by Mr. 
Buckley's body, Officer Getz could not identify the precise source of the damage with 
certainty. Sec id. at 221-22. There was also a pool of blood behind the driver's seat and 
some dark hair on the roof of the car and the left front window, which DNA testing 
revealed matched Mr. Garcia's hair. R. 104:222, 224-26. 
Officer Getz also noted that Mr. Garcia had abrasions on the right and left sides of 
his head and that his scalp was cut on the right side of his head—-the side facing the 
passenger door. R. 104:226. 'frying to explain the injuries on the right side of Mr. 
Garcia's head, Officer Getz concluded that Mr. Garcia's head must have gone out the 
driver's side window and come back in. R. 104:229. However, Officer Getz did not find 
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any blood on the door frame so he was unable to do any additional DNA testing to 
support that theory. R. 104:283. Officer Getz also noted that there was some damage to 
the lower left door and this damage seemed consistent with Mr. Garcia's minor leg injury. 
R.104:228. 
Other than the DNA evidence from the hair, no other DNA evidence was offered 
at trial. 11.104:227, 234. The police had removed the airbags and steering wheel for 
DNA and fingerprint testing, but tests on those items were inconclusive. R. 104:234. 
The police did not perform any additional testing on any other parts of the car. R. 104: 
279-80. At the close of Detective Getz's testimony, he stated that the evidence led him to 
conclude that Mr. Garcia was driving. R. 104:235, 
On cross-examination, Officer Getz testified that three windows were missing as 
was the rear windshield, R. 104:240, and he could not conclusively determine how Mr. 
Garcia had exited the vehicle. R. 104:246. While he testified on direct examination 
about the potential movement of the vehicle's occupants, on cross-examination, he 
acknowledged that "occupants inside a vehicle can be thrown around in surprising or 
uncommon ways from an accident of this nature." 104:246. He also could not be certain 
about whether Mr. Garcia had moved Mr. Buckley after the accident happened but before 
the witnesses had arrived. R. 104:247. Officer Getz further acknowledged that the 
police did not test the fluids in the car to determine their origin or if any blood belonged 
to Mr. Garcia and that the police officers failed to take any fingerprints on any other part 
of the car, i.e., the keys, the emergency brake, or the stickshifL R. 104:279-890. 
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At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on 
the basis that the State had not "met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt" 
because the cause of Mr. Buckley's death was inconclusive. R. 104:294. The trial court 
denied the motion, and the case proceeded. Sec id. 
In closing argument, defense counsel argued that there was insufficient evidence 
to support an automobile homicide conviction. 11.104:316-22. He pointed out, for 
example, that no witnesses saw the accident, and thus, none of them could identify who 
was driving the car, nor could anyone conclude whether the vehicle was being operated 
in a negligent manner. Further, Officer Getz testified that the car was traveling 
somewhere between fifty and sixty-five miles per hour and the speed limit at the scene of 
the accident was sixty miles per hour. R.104:321. Defense counsel also pointed out that 
while DNA evidence from the steering wheel or airbags could have been illustrative, 
none of that evidence was presented. Further, Officer Getz had stated that it was not 
clear how soon after the accident the first witnesses arrived and sufficient time could 
have passed for the occupants in the car to have moved around. R. 104:316. Defense 
counsel also referred to weaknesses with the State's investigation, including that Mr. 
Buckley's cell phone was stolen by the tow truck driver, the police failed to get any 
identifying information from one of the witnesses, and they failed to test the inside of the 
car for biological evidence. R. 104:318. Moreover, Detective Getz had acknowledged 
that in spite of his theory of the case, a spinning or rotating vehicle could produce 
unpredictable results. R. 104:319. 
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Additionally, defense counsel pointed out that Mr. Garcia had maintained his 
innocence even before the police had arrived, Mr. Buckley was likely intoxicated at the 
time of the accident, and it is possible that he died from an overdose or from not wearing 
a seatbelt. R. 104:315, 318, 321, 322. Based on a lack of evidence, defense counsel 
asserted that the State had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 
104:323. The jury, however, disagreed and found Mr. Garcia guilty of automobile 
homicide. Mr. Garcia appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
While the evidence presented at trial indicates that Mr. Garcia and Mr. Buckley 
were involved in a tragic car accident during which both men were likely intoxicated and 
that Mr. Buckley died hours after the accident, the evidence is inconclusive to support the 
conclusion that Mr. Garcia was driving the car at the time of the accident or that he was 
driving it in a negligent manner. Furthermore, because the evidence on these two 
elements of the charged crime was lacking, and the automobile homicide law was well-
settled at the time of trial, the trial court committed plain error by submitting the case to 
the jury. Consequently, Mr. Garcia's conviction for automobile homicide should be 
reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Should Reverse Mr. Garcia's Conviction for Automobile 
Homicide Because the Evidence is Insufficient to Demonstrate that he 
Was Driving the Car or that he Was Negligent. 
Mr. Garcia's conviction for automobile homicide should be reversed because the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence that he was driving the car at the time of the 
accident or that he was doing so in a negligent manner. Utah's Automobile Homicide 
statute states that a person commits automobile homicide if he "operatc[s'| a vehicle in a 
negligent manner causing the death of another and . . . has sufficient alcohol in his body 
[such | that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test " Utah Code Ann. § 76-
5-207(3)(i), (iii) (Supp. 2006). The statute further explains that "negligence" means 
"simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent 
persons exercise under like or similar circumstances." Id. § 76-5-207(2)(c). Thus, to 
demonstrate that Mr. Garcia committed aggravated homicide, the State must present 
evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Garcia (1) was operating the 
vehicle at the time of the accident; (2) in a negligent manner; (3) that the accident caused 
the death of Mr. Buckley; and (4) that Mr. Garcia had a sufficient level of alcohol in his 
blood stream at the time the accident occurred. Sec id. 
In this instance, while the evidence regarding Mr. Garcia's blood alcohol level is 
undisputed, there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Garcia was 
operating the vehicle at the time of the accident or that he was doing so in a negligent 
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manner. Further, because this evidence relates to two essential elements of the charged 
crime and the automobile homicide statute was well-settled at the time of trial, this error 
was "so obvious and fundamental that the trial court [committed plain] err[or] in 
submitting] the case to the jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,«[[ 17, 10 P.3d 346. 
Consequently, this court should reverse Mr. Garcia's conviction. 
A. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support the Finding that Mr. Garcia 
was Driving the Vehicle at the Time of the Accident 
Mr. Garcia's conviction for automobile homicide should be reversed because there 
was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Garcia was driving the vehicle at 
the time of the accident. "To set aside a verdict it must appear that the evidence was so 
inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime." In re K. K. H. ,610 P.2d 849, 
852 (Utah 1980). In this case, the jury must have entertained reasonable doubt as to who 
was driving the vehicle because, at the very least, there were no witnesses to the accident; 
see R. 2, nobody could place either Mr. Garcia or Mr. Buckley behind the wheel of the 
car, the medical examiner could not opine as to which individual was driving; R.103:145, 
the State failed to adequately gather and test the biological evidence from the vehicle to 
determine who was driving or if the occupants of the vehicle had moved after the 
accident; R: 104:283, 227, 234; and there was an unexplained dent on the inside rear 
door, which the State's accident reconstructionist could not specifically account for, and 
which suggests at least some movement after the accident, R. 104:221. Because there 
was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Garcia was driving the Mazda at 
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the time ofthe accident, the trial court committed plain error by submitting this case to 
the jury. 
In other cases where a defendant's conviction for automobile homicide has been 
sustained, there has been ample evidence to support the theory that the defendant was 
driving the car at the time ofthe accident. Sec e.g., State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 
1984). For example, in State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court sustained a conviction for automobile homicide where there was no evidence to 
indicate that anyone else could have been driving the vehicle involved in a fetal accident. 
See id. at 483. In that case, a Chevrolet Blazer struck a car and killed one ofthe 
vehicle's occupants as the car was parked in an emergency lane. See id. at 480-81. While 
there was no direct evidence that the defendant had been driving the Blazer, the supreme 
court upheld the defendant's conviction because the first witness to arrive at the scene 
saw the defendant crawling out ofthe Blazer from the driver's seat and there was no 
evidence to indicate that anyone else had been in the Blazer at the time ofthe accident. 
See 14 at 483; see also State v. McPhec, 684 P.2d 57, 58 (Utah 1984) (sustaining 
conviction where evidence indicated that the defendant was heavily intoxicated, insisted 
on driving, and was in fact driving at the time ofthe accident). In this case, however, 
there is no such similar evidence. 
The primary, or marshaled, evidence supporting the jury's verdict includes the 
following: (1) witness testimony that Mr. Buckley was lying face down in the back seat 
ofthe car after the accident; (2) Dr. Grey's testimony that Mr. Buckley likely died from 
brain injuries sustained during the accident and that Mr. Garcia was intoxicated at the 
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time of the accident; and (3) Officer Getz's theory regarding the motion of the occupants 
in the vehicle. Officer Getz's theory was based on his reconstruction of the accident, 
which involved him taking right handed turns at ten to fifteen miles per hour; his 
observations regarding the accident scene, including damage to the ear and the guardrails 
and skidmarks on the road; a diagram of the accident with which he explained to the jury 
the possible movement of the car; a "tuft" of Mr. Garcia's hair found in the upper-middle 
of the driver's side door; lacerations on the right side of Mr. Garcia's head and a minor 
left leg injury; and the eyewitnesses' account of Mr. Buckley position in the car after the 
accident. See generally R. 104: 289-93. This evidence however, is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction for automobile homicide because it does not support the conclusion 
that Mr. Garcia was driving at the time of the accident. 
As previously mentioned, there were no witnesses to the accident involving Mr. 
Garcia and Mr. Buckley. See R. 2. Further, Dr. Grey, the medical examiner, could not 
determine whether Mr. Buckley was the driver or the passenger. See R. 103:145. While 
Officer Getz testified as to his theory of the accident, he could not rule out the possibility 
that the collisions with the guardrails would have caused Mr. Garcia and Mr. Buckley to 
move around in the vehicle in an unpredictable pattern. See R. 104:246. Further, Officer 
Getz's conclusion was based on limited evidence. There was a significant amount of 
blood in the car that the State failed to analyze. The State also foiled to recover any 
conclusive DNA evidence from the steering wheel or the airbags, and it did not test any 
parts of the car for fingerprints. 
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Moreover, at the time the accident occurred, the Mazda was traveling 
approximately sixty miles per hour and it collided with barriers three times before 
coming to a rest. As defense counsel pointed out at trial, the location of the Mr. Garcia's 
hair in the center of the driver's side door docs not support Officer Getz's theory that 
everything was moving back and to the left. Additionally, Mr. Garcia had a cut on his 
head where it appeared some hair had been ripped out, but that cut was on the right side 
of his head, not the left. Based on the pattern of Mr. Garcia's injuries and the fact that 
Officer Getz could not explain how Mr. Garcia got out of the car, Officer Getz's theory 
does not rule out the possibility that Mr. Garcia was thrown from the vehicle from the 
passenger seat through the driver's side window. Further, the induced damage in the rear 
of the car indicates that there was some significant movement in the car after the accident 
and thus there is some doubt as to whether Mr. Buckley moved or was moved after the 
accident. Based on this evidence or lack thereof, the jury must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt as to which individual was driving the car at the time of the accident. 
Consequently, the trial court should not have submitted this case to the jury. 
i. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting this Case 
to the Jury 
Because the evidence was so lacking on an essential element of the charged crime, 
i.e., whether Mr. Garcia was driving the car, the trial court committed plain error by 
submitting the case to the jury. To establish plain error, Mr. Garcia must demonstrate (1) 
"that the evidence was insufficient to support [his] conviction" and (2) "that the 
insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the 
16 
case to the jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 17, 10 P.3d 346. Discussing this 
standard in greater detail, the supreme court has explained that where the evidence on an 
essential clement of the crime is lacking, plain error results. See id. ("While it is difficult 
for the court on appeal to dictate when an evidentiary defect was apparent to the trial 
court," plain error would result in the case in which the State presents no evidence to 
support an essential element of a criminal charge). As demonstrated above, the 
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Garcia was 
driving the car at the time of the accident. Because this issue involves an essential 
element of the State's case, the trial court erred in submitting this case to the jury. Sjx id. 
Further, this error was obvious and fundamental because the automobile homicide 
law was well-settled at the time of trial. In State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276, the 
supreme court explained that "[t]o establish that the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, [the defendant] must show that the law governing the error was clear at the 
time the alleged error was made." Id. ^ 16. In this case, the accident in question is 
governed by the 2006 version of Utah Code section § 76-5-207. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-207 (Supp. 2006). While the automobile statute held been amended in years 2003, 
2004, and 2005, those amendments were minor, i.e., made stylistic changes or updated 
statutory references. Sec [d § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2008) (amendment notes); kf § 76-5-207 
(2003) (amendment notes). In fact, the last substantive amendment to the statute 
occurred in 2002, six years before the accident in question. See id1_§ 76-5-207 (2003) 
(amendment notes). Because the statute had not been substantively amended for several 
years prior to the accident in question, the automobile homicide law was clear at the time 
17 
of Mr. Garcia's trial. Thus, Mr. Garcia has satisfied both elements of the plain error 
standard, as it relates to insufficiency of the evidence claims. In other words, he has 
demonstrated (1) that there was an error because the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence on whether he was driving—an essential element of the charged crime, and (2) 
that error was obvious because the automobile homicide law was clear at the time of trial. 
Consequently, the trial court should reverse Mr. Garcia's conviction on the basis of plain 
error. 
B. There was Insufficient Evidence to Support a Finding that the Car Was 
Being Driven in a Negligent Manner 
Mr. Garcia's conviction should also be reversed because the State failed to present 
any evidence on another element of the charged crime, or more specifically, that the car 
was being operated in a negligent manner at the time of the accident. Utah Code section 
76-5-207 explains that "[ criminal homicide is automobile homicide . . . if the person 
operates a vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and" that person has 
sufficient alcohol in their system at the time of the accident. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
207(3)(i), (iii) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). The statute further indicates that to find 
that the driver of the car operated the vehicle negligently, the jury must find that the 
driver "failfed] to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons 
exercise under like or similar circumstances." Id, § 76-5-207(2)(c). While the jury may 
have attempted to collapse the negligence element into the intoxication element, the plain 
language of the statute requires a different result. Put another way, the prosecution was 
required to prove that Mr. Garcia was intoxicated "and" that he operated the vehicle in a 
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negligent manner. Id. § 76-5-207(3) (emphasis added). Any other reading of the statute 
would render the appearance of the word "and" meaningless, and the statutory 
requirement of negligence superfluous. See State v. Richardson, 2006 UT App 238, ]\ 13, 
139 P.3d 278 ("When interpreting the plain language of a particular statute, 'courts 
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly . . . .'" (quoting State v. Germonto, 
2003 UT App 217,1(7, 73 P.3d 978)). 
The Utah Supreme Court illustrated this evidentiary requirement in State v. 
Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983). In that case, the court pointed out the defendant's 
negligence in an automobile homicide. Notably, the court explained that the defendant, 
whose blood alcohol content was .12, was "clearly negligent" because he "rac[ed| 
through a yellow light at an excessive speed." Id. at 379; see also State v. Durrant, 561 
P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1977), overruled by State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1979) 
(holding that "[ojnee the question of driving under the influence of liquor is established, 
the crime of automobile homicide is made out by the death of another person by reason of 
operating the ear in a negligent manner" (emphasis added))/ The fact that Mr. Hamblin 
was intoxicated was not the basis for a negligence finding. The same result is required in 
this case. While Mr. Garcia may have had a blood alcohol content of .15, the plain 
3
 Although State v. Durrant 561 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1977) was overruled by State v. 
Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1979), it was overruled on the basis that the automobile 
homicide statute—as it existed at the time—required criminal, not simple negligence. 
See id. (interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 1975)). The automobile 
homicide statute, however, has since been amended. In its current form, the statute 
criminalizes simple negligence. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)(c) (Supp. 2005). 
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language of the statute requires an additional finding that he operated the vehicle in a 
negligent manner at the time of the accident. 
The jury instructions given in this case reflect similarly. For example, instruction 
31 indicates that the jury could "consider the degree of intoxication or the amount of 
alcohol consumed by the defendant as one of the factors in determining whether the 
defendant was negligent while operating the motor vehicle." R. 79 (Emphasis added). 
By mentioning the fact that intoxication is just one factor the jury could consider, this 
instruction directs the jury to find additional evidence on which to base its negligence 
finding. Thus, based on the plain language of the statute, the jury instructions given in 
this case, and the State's burden to present evidence on each element of the charged 
crime, see State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986), it was not enough for the State to 
establish that the vehicle's driver was intoxicated; rather the State should have presented 
some evidence to indicate that the driver operated the vehicle negligently at the time the 
accident occurred. In other words, the State was required to establish that Mr. Garcia 
failed to exercise reasonable care while driving the vehicle, i.e., that he ran a red light, 
was speeding, failed to keep a proper look out for traffic, or failed to yield. 
In closing argument, the prosecution argued that Mr. Garcia was negligent, in part, 
because the Mazda went across the yellow line, the brakes were applied, "the vehicle 
skidded, went out of control and hit the . . . guardrail. Right there, the evidence is that 
the —the driver of the vehicle was acting negligently." R. 104:298. This evidence, 
however, is insufficient because there was no evidence illuminating what caused the car 
to veer off the road. For example, there were no cell phone records introduced to 
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establish that either occupant was on the phone or sending text messages at the time of 
the accident and no testimony was offered to establish that the vehicle's driver had dozed 
off. Further, as defense counsel argued at trial, it is quite possible that the driver of the 
vehicle had been trying to avoid an animal or another car, see R. 104:315, or that the car 
had slipped on what Officer Getz acknowledged were wet roads that evening. Other than 
evidence indicating that Mr. Garcia had a blood alcohol level above the legal limit, there 
was simply no evidence to suggest that he had been operating the vehicle negligently at 
the time the accident occurred. Without any evidence on this element of the charged 
crime, the jury's conclusion could only have been based on speculation, and speculation 
alone does not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re M.B., 
2008 UTApp 433, H 1. 
i. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting this Case 
to the Jury 
The trial court committed plain error by submitting this case to the jury because 
there was no evidence presented on negligence—an essential element of the charged 
crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(2)-(3) (Supp. 2006); see also State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, If 17, 10 P.3d 346. While the prosecution may have established that Mr. 
Garcia was intoxicated at the time of the accident, it presented no evidence to indicate 
that Mr. Garcia was operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. Because negligence is 
an essential element in the charged offense, Mr. Garcia has established that an error 
occurred at his trial. Thus, he has satisfied the first requirement of the plain error 
standard. See id. ("While it is difficult for the court on appeal to dictate when an 
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evidentiary defect was apparent to the trial court," plain error would result in the case in 
which the State presents no evidence to support an essential element of a criminal 
charge). Further, this error was obvious and fundamental because, as previously 
explained, the automobile homicide law was well-settled at the time of Mr. Gareia's trial. 
Consequently, it was obvious error for the trial court to submit his case to the jury and 
this court should reverse Mr. Gareia's conviction on the basis of plain error. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should reverse Mr. Gareia's conviction for automobile homicide 
because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and the trial court 
committed plain error by submitting the case to the jury. 
SUBMITTED this \1> day of January, 2009. 
DEBORAH KATZ LEVI 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Tab A 
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-207 (Supp. 2006) 
§ 76-5-207'. Automobile homicide 
(1) As used in this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and in-
cludes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person op-
erates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a ve-
hicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation. 
(b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is 
subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2). 
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(3)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person 
operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another 
and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time 
of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a ve-
hicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as 
defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the 
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 
apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section. 
(5) CalculcUions of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made 
in accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(l). 
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally en-
titled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense. 
(7) Kvidcncc of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissi-
ble except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
Laws 1985, 1st Sp.Scss, c. 1, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 148, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 16L §3: 
Laws 2002, c. 106, § 9, el l May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 10, $ 2, off. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2004. c. 228. § 6, ciT. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 2, § 301, cff. Feb. 2, 2005; 
Laws 2006, c. 341, § 8, eff. May 1, 2006. 
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